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The expanding ability of robots to take unsupervised decisions renders it imperative that mechanisms are in place to guarantee the
safety of their behaviour. Moreover, intelligent autonomous robots should be more than safe; arguably they should also be explicitly
ethical. In this paper, we put forward a method for implementing ethical behaviour in robots inspired by the simulation theory of cog-
nition. In contrast to existing frameworks for robot ethics, our approach does not rely on the verification of logic statements. Rather, it
utilises internal simulations which allow the robot to simulate actions and predict their consequences. Therefore, our method is a form of
robotic imagery. To demonstrate the proposed architecture, we implement a version of this architecture on a humanoid NAO robot so
that it behaves according to Asimov’s laws of robotics. In a series of four experiments, using a second NAO robot as a proxy for the
human, we demonstrate that the Ethical Layer enables the robot to prevent the human from coming to harm in simple test scenarios.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Robots are becoming ever more autonomous. Semi-
autonomous flying robots are commercially available,
and driver-less cars are undergoing real-world tests
(Waldrop, 2015). This trend towards robots with increased
autonomy is expected to continue (Anderson & Anderson,
2007). An expanding ability to take unsupervised decisions
renders it imperative that mechanisms are in place to guar-
antee the safety of behaviour executed by the robot. The
fact that many robots are designed to interact with humans
further heightens the importance of equipping robots with
mechanisms guaranteeing safety (Royakkers & van Est,
2015; Winfield, 2012). For example, the state-of-the-art in
robots for care, companionship, and collaborativehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002
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& Tietze, 2015; Lin, Abney, & Bekey, 2011). At the other
end of the spectrum of robot-human interaction, the devel-
opment of fully autonomous robots for military applica-
tions is progressing rapidly (e.g., Arkin, Ulam, &
Wagner, 2012; Lin et al., 2011; Sharkey, 2008; Xin &
Bin, 2013).
Robot safety is essential but not sufficient. Smart auton-
omous robots should be more than safe; they should also
be explicitly ethical – able to both choose and justify
(Anderson & Anderson, 2007; Moor, 2006) actions that
prevent harm. As the cognitive, perceptual and motor
capabilities of robots expand, they will be expected to have
an improved capacity for moral judgment. As summarised
by Picard and Picard (1997), the greater the freedom of a
machine, the more it will need moral standards.
The necessity of robots equipped with ethical capacities
is recognised both in academia (e.g., Arkin et al., 2012;rg/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1997; Wallach & Allen, 2008) and wider society, with influ-
ential figures such as Bill Gates, Elon Musk and Stephen
Hawking speaking out on the dangers of increasing auton-
omy in artificial agents. Nevertheless, only a few studies
have implemented robot ethics. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the efforts of Anderson and Anderson (2010) and
our previous work (Winfield, Blum, & Liu, 2014) are the
only instances of robots equipped with (limited) moral
principles. So far, most work has been either theoretical
(e.g., Mackworth, 2011; Wallach & Allen, 2008) or simula-
tion based (e.g., Arkin et al., 2012). Irrespective of whether
the work was done in real robots or not, existing architec-
tures for ethical robots are based on logic frameworks
(Arkin et al., 2012; Bringsjord, Arkoudas, & Bello, 2006;
Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2015). This approach uses
artificial reasoning processes to verify whether the robotic
behaviour satisfies a set of predetermined ethical con-
straints. This approach to ethical robots is reminiscent of
Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) in the sense that it relies
heavily on abstract symbolic reasoning (Mackworth, 2011).
1.1. The simulation theory of cognition
Pinker (1997) argued extensively that the human mind
has not evolved to be an abstract symbol manipulator.
Since then, advances in cognitive science have confirmed
that the computations underlying human cognition are
very different from rule-based manipulation of abstract
symbols (Barsalou, 2010). This view has emerged in many
domains of human cognition, including perception, reason-
ing and problem-solving (see Barsalou, 1999; Dijkstra &
Post, 2015; Hegarty, 2004; Wilson, 2002 for more exam-
ples). Moreover, representing, learning and combining con-
cepts leads to some problems in purely symbolic systems
(Ga¨rdenfors, 2004; Lieto, Chella, & Frixione, 2016). There-
fore, it seems the mind uses representations that are richer
than the abstract symbols allowed for in models of intelli-
gence that presume abstract symbols.
The theory of mind that allows for the richest represen-
tations is the simulation theory of cognition (Hesslow,
2002; Wilson, 2002). It hypothesises that thinking utilises
the same cognitive (and neural) processes as interaction
with the external environment. When thinking, actions
are covert and are assumed to generate, via associative
brain mechanisms, the sensory inputs that elicit further
actions (Hesslow, 2012). In this view, thinking requires
building a grounded model of the environment – which is
not composed of abstract symbols. Rather, it is assumed
to re-instantiate and recombine experiences using the
brain’s systems of perception, action, and emotion. The
mental model covertly simulates actions and their associ-
ated perceptual effects (see Hegarty, 2004; Hesslow, 2002;
Hesslow, 2012; Wilson, 2002 for reviews).
In this paper, we put forward a method for implement-
ing ethical behaviour in robots inspired by the simulation
theory of cognition. In contrast to existing frameworksPlease cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
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tion of logic statements. Rather, it utilises internal simula-
tions which allow the robot to simulate actions and predict
their consequences. Therefore, our method is a form of
robotic imagery. Many other areas of robotics have
exploited robotic imagery. In their review of robotic ima-
gery, Marques and Holland (2009) coined the term func-
tional imagination to denote the mechanism whereby
robots covertly simulate actions and their consequences
to steer their future behaviour. Here we adopt their term.
Hence, this paper aims at advancing functional imagina-
tion as a method for ethical robots.
We aim at implementing consequentialist ethics, which
is implicit in the very common conception of morality,
shared by many cultures and traditions (Haines, 2015).
Hence, developing an architecture suited for this class of
ethics is a reasonable starting point. Moreover, the primary
advantage of a functional imagination is the ability to test
the outcome of potential actions (Hesslow, 2002; Hesslow,
2012) without committing to them (Marques & Holland,
2009; Ziemke, Jirenhed, & Hesslow, 2005). Therefore, func-
tional imagination is a framework suitable for supporting
consequentialist ethics.
2. Architecture
Over the years, keeping track with shifts in paradigms
(Murphy, 2000), many architectures for robot controllers
have been proposed (see Kortenkamp & Simmons (2008,
2005, 2000) for reviews). However, given the hierarchical
organisation of behaviour (Botvinick, 2008), most robotic
control architectures can be remapped onto a three-
layered model (Kortenkamp & Simmons, 2008). In this
model, each control level is characterised by differences in
the degree of abstraction and time scale at which it oper-
ates. At the top level, the controller generates long-term
goals (e.g. ‘Deliver the package to room 221’). Next, goals
are translated into a set of tasks that should be executed
(e.g. ‘Follow corridor’, ‘Open door’, etc.). Finally, the tasks
are translated into (sensori) motor actions that can be exe-
cuted by the robot (e.g. ‘Raise arm’ and ‘Turn wrist joint’).
Obviously, this general characterization ignores many par-
ticulars of individual control architectures.
Assuming that the robot is controlled by a three-layered
controller (Fig. 1a), we agree with Arkin (Arkin, 2008;
Arkin et al., 2012) that ethical behaviour should be gov-
erned by adding a fourth specialised control layer. This
Ethical Layer (Fig. 1b) should act as a governor evaluating
behaviour proposed by each of the three other layers before
the robot executes it. In principle, the functionality of the
Ethical Layer could be distributed across and integrated
with the layers present in existing control architectures.
Indeed, in humans, ethical decision making is most likely
supported by the same computational machinery as deci-
sion making in other domains (Young & Dungan, 2012).
Nevertheless, from an engineering point of view, guaran-
teeing the ethical behaviour of the robot through a separaterchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002
Fig. 1. The robot controller (a) generates a set of prospective behavioural alternatives. Before executing one of these alternatives, the robot controller
sends the set to the Ethical Layer (b) to be checked (c). Checking each prospective behaviour is done using the Simulation Module (d). Using the current
state of the world, human and robot as a starting point, this module simulates for each behaviour in the set both the motor and sensory consequences of
the behaviour and the resulting internal states of the human and robot. For each behavioural alternative, the Simulation Module sends the predicted
internal states of the robot and the human to the Evaluation Module (e). The Evaluation Module combines the internal states into a single measure of
action desirability. The Evaluation Module connects to the robot controller to select or inhibit each of the behavioural alternatives (f).
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2012). For one, by implementing the ethical layer as a
just-in-time checker of behaviour, it can act as a fail safe
device checking behaviour before execution. Also, a sepa-
rate Ethical Layer implies its functionality can be scruti-
nised independently from the operation of the robot
controller. The behaviour enforced or prohibited by the
Ethical Layer can be checked and (formally) verified
(Dennis, Fisher, & Winfield, 2015).
The way the Ethical Layer is intended to function is as
follows. By default, the robot controller generates a set of
prospective behavioural alternatives (Fig. 1c). The Simula-
tion Module is initialized with the current state of the
world, robot and human. Starting from this initial state,
the Ethical Layer simulates the consequences of each alter-
native in the current set using the Simulation Module
(Fig. 1d). For each alternative, the Evaluation Module
(Fig. 1e) evaluates the simulated consequences. The output
of this evaluation, i.e. the ethical evaluation of each entry
in the set of behavioural alternatives, is sent to the robot
controller (Fig. 1f). In other words, the Simulation Module
and the Evaluation Module continuously loop through the
behavioural alternative as they are generated by the robot
controller. Having evaluated all the alternatives, the Ethi-
cal Layer returns an evaluation of each alternative and
sends this to the robot control.
When modelling reasoning and strategy switching in
humans, Donoso, Collins, and Koechlin (2014) found thatPlease cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.assuming humans evaluate no more than two or three alter-
native strategies resulted in the best model fit. This suggests
that humans consider only a few behavioural options - at
least without interrupting the ongoing behaviour and
resorting to longer reflection (Kahneman, 2011). The
restricted number of behavioural alternatives people con-
sider is probably due to limits in cognitive capacity, e.g.,
working memory. Thus, experimental evidence indicates
that implementing ethical behaviour on a robot should
require only a small number of behavioural alternatives
to be generated and evaluated. Evaluating a limited num-
ber of behavioural alternatives would improve the respon-
siveness of the robots and prevent the Ethical Layer from
introducing delays.
2.1. The Simulation Module
Cognitive research has focused mostly on demonstrating
the involvement of mental simulations in cognition. Much
less work has been done to unravel the computational
operations underlying simulation and how the results of
simulations are used (Barsalou, 2010; Marques &
Holland, 2009). Indeed, simulating behaviour and its out-
come is far from trivial. Nevertheless, in the field of cogni-
tive science authors typically take the ability to simulate for
granted and assume some underspecified processes under-
lying them (e.g., Zwaan, 2003). Hence, in this paper, the
structure of the Simulation Module we put forward isrchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
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findings in cognitive science (see also Marques &
Holland, 2009 and the discussion therein). We suggest that
the Simulation Module needs to be equipped with (1) a
model of the robot controller, (2) a domain specific model
of the human and (3) a model of the world (Fig. 1, g-i). The
model of the world might contain a physical model of both
human and robot as well as a model of objects.
The model of the robot is taken to be a sufficiently accu-
rate model of the robotic controller. Using this model as a
forward model, in combination with the world model, the
Simulation Module can simulate the future motor, sensor
and internal states for the robot (See Marques &
Holland, 2009 for a discussion of forward models for
self-simulation). Low fidelity simulations could model the
motions of agents as ballistic trajectories. On the other
hand, high fidelity simulations are rendered feasible by
advanced physics and sensor based simulation tools such
as Webots (Michel, 2004), player-stage (Vaughan &
Gerkey, 2007) or graphic engines (Macaluso et al., 2005).
Including a model of the robot controller in the Simula-
tion Module allows the evaluation of behavioural alterna-
tives at each of the three levels of robot control, i.e., at the
level of goals, tasks and actions. This is to say, the Ethical
Layer could predict and evaluate the outcomes of goals
(‘What happens if I deliver the package to room 221?’)
and tasks (‘What happens if I open the door?’) as well as
actions (‘What would happen if I executed the motions
required for opening the door?’). By translating goals and
tasks into actions, the ethics of higher level goals can be
evaluated by considering the actions which they induce.
This has the advantage that the ultimate consequences of
goals and tasks can be predicted.
Including a model of the human (or several humans),
the Simulation Module can predict the future sensory
and motor states of the human(s) (e.g., Marques &
Holland, 2009; Vaughan & Gerkey, 2007). However, also
internal states, including emotions, can be simulated.
Indeed, the ability to make these rich predictions is what
the mental simulation theory of cognition asserts (see
Hesslow, 2012; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001 for ref-
erences). Mental simulation has been suggested to underlie
empathy and the understanding of other’s emotions
(Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Shanton &
Goldman, 2010). In humans, the same neural machinery
that supports action and perception during overt behaviour
supports the mental simulations of sensory and internal
states (Gallese et al., 2004; Hesslow, 2002; Hesslow, 2012;
Kortenkamp & Simmons, 2008; Shanton & Goldman,
2010). However, in robots, this will have to be supported
by a sufficiently complex model of the human. In agree-
ment with findings in cognitive science, we suggest that
the simulated emotional states or the emotions associated
with the sensory states are evaluated to assess the desirabil-
ity of an action, at least when acting under time pressure
(Kahneman, 2011).Please cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.Implementing a sufficiently elaborate model of the
human is potentially the most challenging component of
the Ethical Layer. However, practically speaking, it should
be possible to devise a model of the human that is compat-
ible with the limited degrees of freedom and restricted
application domains of current robots. Indeed, the com-
plexity of the human model only needs to match the robot’s
complexity and domain of application. We believe it should
be possible to devise human models for currently realisable
agents with limited application domains, e.g. driver-less
cars, personal assistants or military robots. As an example
of a domain-specific human model used by a robot, Kato,
Kanda, and Ishiguro (2015) developed a model that allows
robotic shopping assistants to predict when to approach a
customer. In related work, Nigam and Riek (2015) suc-
ceeded in training a robot to recognise when it was accept-
able to approach people in different social settings. RIBA,
a nursing-care assistant robot uses a model of the human
body to estimate a person’s comfort while lifting her from
the bed (Ding et al., 2012). As a final example, the area of
human-aware robot navigation seeks to equip robots will
models of humans that allow them to navigate the same
space without violating social rules (Kruse, Pandey,
Alami, & Kirsch, 2013).
2.2. The Evaluation Module
The Evaluation Module combines the simulated out-
comes, for both the robot and human, into a single metric
reflecting the desirability of a given behavioural alternative.
The way in which the Evaluation Module collapses the
multidimensional simulation results into a single unidimen-
sional value determines which ethical rules it implements.
How to select the ethical rules a robot should follow is
currently largely an outstanding problem and various
authors have suggested multiple approaches (see Allen,
Smit, & Wallach, 2005 for a review). Although no consen-
sus has been reached, even in simple scenarios (Anderson &
Anderson, 2010), we need to put forward a definition of
ethical behaviour against which the behaviour can be eval-
uated, at least, in the context of our experiments.
Asimov (1950) is the earliest, and probably best known,
author to put forward a set of ethical rules governing robot
behaviour (List 1). At first sight, implementing rules
derived from a work of fiction might seem an inappropriate
starting point. However, in contrast, to general consequen-
tialist ethical frameworks, such as Utilitarianism, Asimov’s
Laws explicitly govern the behaviour of robots and their
interaction with humans.
Several authors have argued against using Asimov’s
laws for governing robotic behaviour (Anderson &
Anderson, 2007; Murphy & Woods, 2009). For example,
Anderson and Anderson (2010) rejected Asimov’s laws as
unsuited for guiding robot behaviour because laws might
conflict. However, in the context of the current paper, we
can use Asimov’s laws to demonstrate the efficacy of architecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
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assigning any particular status to them.
List 1. Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov, 1950).
1: A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2: A robot must obey the orders given it by human
beings, except where such orders would conflict with
the First Law.
3: A robot must protect its existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Laws.3. Methods
3.1. Experimental setup
We used two NAO humanoid robots (Aldebaran) in this
study, a blue and a red version. In all experiments, we used
the red robot as a proxy for a human. We equipped the
blue robot with the Ethical Layer. In previous work
(Winfield et al., 2014), we referred to the robot acting as
a proxy for the human as the H-robot (short for Human
robot). The robot equipped with ethical behaviour was
denoted as the A-robot (short for Asimovian robot). In this
paper, we adopt the same nomenclature, and from now on,
we will refer to the blue robot as the A-robot and the red
robot as the H-robot. All experiments were carried out in
a 3 by 2.5 m arena. An overhead tracking system consisting
of 4 cameras was used to monitor the position and orienta-
tion of the robots at a rate of 30 Hz. We equipped the
robots with a clip-on helmet featuring reflective beads.
The tracking system used these to localise the robots. The
arena also contained two small tables, which marked two
goal positions for the robots. These tables had a unique
pattern of reflective beads on their tops. We refer to these
locations as positions A and B in the remainder of the
paper. The sites of these targets in the arena did not
change. However, the valence of the locations varied.
One of the locations was designated as being dangerous
(see below).
Every trial in the experiments started with the H-robot
and the A-robot going to predefined start positions in the
arena. Next, both could be issued a default goal location
to which to go. Asimov’s Laws stipulate that robots should
obey commands issued by a human. Hence, the H-robot
could give the A-robot a command at the beginning of each
experimental trial. We implemented this using the Text-to-
speech and Speech-to-text capabilities of the Nao robots. If
the H-robot issued a command, it spoke one of two sen-
tences: (1) ‘Go to location A’ or (2) ‘Go to location B’.
The Speech-to-text engine running on the A-robot listened
for either sentence. If one of the sentences were recognised,Please cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.the goal location from the received command would over-
ride the current goal of the A-robot.
After the initialization of the target locations for both
the H-robot and the A-robot, the experiment proper began.
Both agents started moving towards their goal positions.
The robots turned their heads as to make them look in
the direction of the currently selected goal position.
Low level collision detection running on both A-robot
and H-robot stopped the robots if they became closer than
0.5 m to each other or the goal position. The Ethical Layer
for the A-robot cycles at about 1 Hz. The Evaluation Mod-
ule could override the current target position of the robot
(specified below). The H-robot was not equipped with an
Ethical Layer. The H-robot moved to its default goal posi-
tion unless its obstacle avoidance process caused it to stop.
The walking speed of the H-robot robot was lower than
the speed of the A-robot. The difference in speed gave the
A-robot a larger range for intercepting the H-robot. The
maximum speeds of the H-robot and A-robot were about
0.03 ms1 and 0.08 ms1 respectively.
3.2. The Ethical Layer
The Ethical Layer monitored the behaviour of the A-
robot. As described above, the Ethical Layer consisted of
the Simulation Module that simulated the outcomes for
both A-robot and H-robot for each prospective action.
The Evaluation Module combined these predictions into
a single measure of desirability. In the following para-
graphs, we describe the current implementation of the
two modules. The functionality of the Ethical Layer as
implemented in this paper is also illustrated in Fig. 2.
3.2.1. Behavioural alternatives
The robot controller was assumed to generate a set of
behavioural alternatives for the A-robot. The robot con-
troller inferred the goal of the H-robot (Fig. 2a). Inferring
the goal was done by calculating the angle between the
gaze direction of the H-robot and the relative position
of both potential goal locations A and B. The location
which returned the smallest angle was taken to be the
goal location of the H-robot. Once the goal location is
determined, a set of alternative goals (positions in the
arena) were generated (Fig. 2b). The set of alternatives
included (1) both target locations A and B and (2) three
positions along the simulated path for the H-robot. If
the H-robot was not detected to be moving (i.e., the
velocity as given by the tracking system is lower than
0.005 ms1) the generation module only returned the
two goal locations A and B as behavioural alternatives.
In addition, behavioural alternatives that, given the rela-
tive speeds of the two robots, could not be reached by
the A-robot before the H-robot, were disregarded. The
behavioural alternatives were sent to the Ethical Layer
to be evaluated.rchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002
Fig. 2. Illustration of the method used to generate behavioural alternatives (panels A & B) and the functionality of the Ethical Layer (panels C & D). (A)
This panel illustrates the process of inferring the goal of the H-robot by the A-robot. In the current case, the A-robot assumes target A is the goal of the H-
robot as the angle (indicated by the wedges) between its gaze and target A is the smallest. (B) The robot controller generates several behavioural
alternatives, i.e., target positions for the A-robot. These include both goal locations A and B and three points spaced equidistantly along the predicted path
(illustrated by the yellow markers along the predicted path and around both goal locations). (C) This panel shows the functionality of the Simulation
Module. For each of the behavioural alternatives, this module predicts the outcome of executing it. Here, we illustrate this process for the single plotted
behavioural alternative (depicted by the yellow circle). The module simulates the H-robot moving along the predicted path and the A-robot moving
towards the indicated point. Whenever both agents are within 0.5 m to each other, the module assumes both agents will stop due to the obstacle avoidance
behaviour. The darker squares depict the predicted final positions for both agents, given the currently simulated behavioural alternative. (D) Finally, the
safety level for both the A-robot and the H-robot is determined based on Eqs. (1) and (2). The states Ih1;i and Ie;i depend on the distance between the final
positions of the agents and the location designated as being dangerous (here, location A as indicated by the red colour).
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For every behavioural alternative, its outcome was pre-
dicted using the Simulation Module. The operation of the
Simulation Module is illustrated in Fig. 2c. The robot’s
model of the human incorporated the following four
assumptions about the human: (1) The H-robot moves in
a straight line to its goal. (2) The safety of the H-robot
depends on its distance from the dangerous location. (3)
The H-robot will stop when closer than 0.5 m to the A-
robot. (4) The H-robot prefers its orders to be followed.
As shown in Fig. 1, the Simulation Module also con-
tains a model of the robot. In this paper, the A-robot sim-
ulated its own behaviour based on the following three
assumptions: (1) The A-robot moves in a straight line to
its goal. (2) The closer the A-robot comes to a dangerous
location, the less safe it is. (3) The A-robot stops when clo-
ser than 0.5 m from the H-robot.Please cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.Using the estimated speed of the H-robot and the
A-robot, the paths of both agents were extrapolated. We
also simulated the obstacle avoidance process running on
both agents. If the paths of the robots were simulated to
come within 0.5 m of each other, it was simulated they
would stop. Hence, in this case, the final positions of the
agents were simulated to be the positions at which obstacle
avoidance would stop them. If the paths were simulated
not to come within 0.5 m from each other, the final posi-
tions of the agents were taken to be the final destination
of the paths.
Finally, the Simulation Module simulated two outcome
states for the H-robot (Fig. 2d). First, the safety level of the
H-robot Ih1;i was given by,
Ih1;i ¼ 1
1þ ebðdh;itÞ ð1Þrchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
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and the dangerous position for prospective action i. This
final distance is given by the outcome of the Simulation
Module. The parameters b and t determine the shape of
the sigmoid function and were set to 10 and 0.25 respec-
tively (see Fig. 3). These values were chosen arbitrarily
and other values result in qualitatively similar results.
A second simulated state for the human, Ih2;i, depended
on whether the A-robot executed an order given by the
H-robot. This state Ih2;i takes the value 1 if the robot exe-
cutes a given order and 1 if it disregards the order. If
no order is given, the parameter Ih2;i takes the value of 0.
Hence, the states Ih1;i and Ih2;i incorporate the assumptions
listed above, taking into account both the danger and
whether a given order was executed by the A-robot.
Likewise, the Simulation Module generated an outcome
state Ie;i describing the robots exposure to the risk associ-
ated with the dangerous location (Fig. 2d) when the
A-robot would execute behavioural alternative i,
Ie;i ¼ 1
1þ ebðde;itÞ ð2Þ
with de;i the final distance between the A-robot and the
dangerous position (using the same values for b and t) as
simulated for prospective action i.
3.2.3. The Evaluation Module
The Evaluation Module combines the simulated states
of the human and the robot into a single metric. The desir-
ability Di of an action i is given by,
Di ¼
if Ih1;i > 0:75 : Ie;i þ Ih2;i  0:75
if Ih1;i 6 0:75 : Ih1;i

ð3Þ
This way of constructing Di ensures that the A-robot only
takes into account its own safety if this does not result in
harm to the H-robot or disobedience. On the other hand,
Di allows for disobedience if following an order would
result in catastrophic results for the H-robot (i.e.,Fig. 3. (A) Graphical representation of the sigmoid function used to calculate I
the helmets used to mount reflective beads for localising the robots. The table
Please cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.Ih2;i is disregarded if the H-robot comes to harm and
Ih1;i 6 0:75).
During each iteration of the Ethical Layer, the Evalua-
tion Module calculates Di for each behavioural alternative
i. The Evaluation Module enforces the alternative i with
the highest value if it differs by at least 0.2 from the next
best option. This hysteresis avoided unnecessary switching
between actions if the differences between their values Di
was too small to be of importance. In other words, this hys-
teresis allowed us to deal with the noise on the values Di.
4. Results
Demonstrating that the A-robot adheres to Asimov’s
laws requires
 demonstrating Law 3, i.e., that the robot can act to self-
preserve if (and only if) this does not conflict with obe-
dience or human safety, and,
 demonstrating that Law 2 takes priority over Law 3, i.e.,
the robot should obey a human, even if this compro-
mises its safety,
 demonstrating that Law 1 takes precedence over Law 3,
i.e., the robot should safeguard a human, even if this
compromises its safety,
 demonstrating that Law 1 takes precedence over Law 2,
i.e., the robot should safeguard a human, even if this
implies disobeying an order.
The series of experiments reported below was designed
to test these requirements. All results reported below are
obtained using the same code. Only the default goals of
the robots and the valence of targets A and B were varied.
All data reported in this paper are available from the Zen-
odo research data repository. [The data and computer code
for this paper are available at DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.
5281/zenodo.801539]. Plots were generated using Mat-
plotlib (Hunter, 2007).e;i and Ih1;i (Eqs. (1) and (2)). (B) View of the arena with two robots. Notice
s serving as goals are visible in the background.
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The first experiment presents a situation in which the
A-robot is initiated with location B as a target. This posi-
tion is designated as a dangerous place. The H-robot does
not move from its default position and issues no command.
Under these circumstances, the H-robot will not come to
harm, and the A-robot can preserve its integrity without
disobeying a command. Hence, in agreement with Law 3,
the Ethical Layer should override the default goal of the
robot and send it to the safe goal position (i.e., position B).
Fig. 4 depicts the results of experiment 1. In agreement
with Asimov’s Laws, the A-robot took action to maintain
its safety. While initiated with the goal of going to the dan-
gerous position B, the Ethical Layer of the robot inter-
rupted this behaviour in favour of going to location A,
the safe place.
4.2. Experiment 2: Obedience
The second experiment is identical to experiment 1 but
for the H-robot issuing a command to the robot. The H-
robot orders the A-robot to go to dangerous position B.
Throughout the experiment, the H-robot stays at the
default position. Having received an order, the A-robot
should go to the dangerous position – the order should
take priority over the robots drive for self-preservation
(Law 2 overrides Law 3, see List 1).
The results depicted in Fig. 5 show that the A-robot
behaved in agreement with Asimov’s laws. Despite being
able to detect the danger of going to the dangerous position
B (refer to experiment 1, Fig. 4), the robot approached this
position. This behaviour follows from the way the Evalua-
tion Module calculates the value Di. Disregarding an order
the value of Di outbalances the increase in Ie;i that is gained
from disregarding the order, and staying safe.Fig. 4. Results of experiment 1, demonstrating the ability of the Ethical Layer
order. (A) Overlaid snapshots for a single trial of the experiment taken by an
robot. (B) Traces of the both robots in 5 trials of the experiments. Different run
internal state of the Ethical Layer for the first trial in the experiment (depicted i
markers. Yellow markers indicate the behavioural alternatives evaluated by th
behavioural alternatives generated are the two goal locations A and B. The bes
Ethical Layer is indicated using a grey arrow. (For interpretation of the referenc
this article.)
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In experiment 3, the H-robot moves to location A. The
A-robot starts by going to location B. Location A is the
dangerous position (Fig. 6). Because location A is danger-
ous, the Ethical Layer should detect the imminent danger
for the H-robot and prevent it (Law 1).
Importantly, to prevent the H-robot from reaching the
hazardous location, the A-robot needs to approach this
location because the A-robot can only stop the H-robot
by intercepting it. Hence, A-robot stops the H-robot
despite this leading to a lower safety value for Ie;i (i.e., some
harm to the A-robot). Indeed, the A-robot approaches the
dangerous position more closely than the H-robot.
4.4. Experiment 4: Human safety and obedience
Experiment 4 is identical to experiment 3 but for the H-
robot issuing a command at the start of each trial. The A-
robot is ordered by the H-robot to go to position B. Loca-
tion A is set as dangerous. Therefore, the Ethical Layer
should detect the imminent danger for the H-robot and
prevent it. However, this conflicts with the issued com-
mand. Nevertheless, as the preservation of the H-robot’s
safety takes priority over obedience, the robot should stop
the H-robot (Law 1 overrides Law 2). Once the H-robot
stops, the danger is averted. The A-robot should then pro-
ceed to carry out the order to go to location B (Law 2).
This behaviour is shown in Fig. 7.
5. Discussion
The impact of the current work is twofold. First, it rep-
resents an addition to the very limited body of work on
Ethical Robots. Most work on ethical robots has been
done in simulation. To the best of our knowledge, onlyto prioritise self-preservation in the absence of danger to the H-robot or an
overhead camera. The red NAO is the H-robot. The blue NAO is the A-
s are marked using different colours. (C) Visualisation of a snapshot of the
n panel A). The current locations of both agents are indicated using square
e Ethical Layer. As the H-robot is not moving in this experiment, the only
t behavioural alternative (i.e., with the highest value Di) as inferred by the
es to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
rchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
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Fig. 5. Results for experiment 2, demonstrating the A-robotr obedience – in spite of being sent to a dangerous location. Panels and legends identical to
Fig. 4.
Fig. 6. Results for experiment 3, with the H-robot initialized as going to the dangerous location A. In this case, the Ethical Layer detects the impending
danger for the H-robot. It determines that the H-robot should be stopped. Panels (A-C) and legends identical to Fig. 4. (C) At this stage of the trial, the H-
robot is inferred to go to A, which is dangerous. The Ethical Layer evaluating the four behavioural alternatives (a fifth alternative, closer to the H-robot,
has been disregarded as unreachable by the A-robot before the H-robot), depicted in yellow, finds that going to the alternative labelled as ’Best
Alternative’ results in the highest value Di. Hence, the A-robot executes this alternative. Once the H-robot has been stopped, the original goal B can be
pursued (see panels A & B).
Fig. 7. Results of experiment 4, in which the robot disobeys an order if this would conflict with preventing the H-robot coming to harm. Once, the H-
robot has been prevented from coming to harm, the A-robot executes the given order.
D. Vanderelst, A. Winfield /Cognitive Systems Research xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 9Anderson and Anderson (2010) and Winfield et al. (2014)
have implemented ethical behaviour on physical robots.
As such, the current paper provides an additional proof
of concept of the idea that robots can be programmed to
behave ethically. Secondly, and most important, our paper
presents an alternative to the logic-based A.I. that currentlyPlease cite this article in press as: Vanderelst, D., & Winfield, A. An a
cognition. Cognitive Systems Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.dominates the field. We speculate that a simulation based
approach, inspired by findings in cognitive science, could be
an alternative (or additional) framework for implementing
robotic ethics. Indeed, using the terminology of Marques
and Holland (2009), this paper advances the use of functional
imagination as a method for ethical robots.rchitecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of
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10 D. Vanderelst, A. Winfield /Cognitive Systems Research xxx (2017) xxx–xxxIn other areas of robotics, functional imagination has
been employed as a way of dealing with the limitations of
logic-based reasoning (Marques & Holland, 2009;
Winfield, 2014; Ziemke et al., 2005). We believe that, cur-
rently, the field of ethical robots is too young to dismiss
any of the possible methods that might be used to endow
robots with morality (see Mackworth (2011) for yet
another method based on Dynamic Constraint Satisfac-
tion). Hence, we explicitly offer our approach as an addi-
tional method rather than an alternative to logic
frameworks.
Our approach to ethical robots is part of the emerging
trend to use functional imagination (Marques & Holland,
2009) to support various cognitive and sensorimotor func-
tions in robots. Mental simulation has been suggested a
method for increasing robots’ resilience to failure
(Bongard, Zykov, & Lipson, 2006), enhance motor coordi-
nation (Vaughan & Zuluga, 2006), support self-awareness
(Winfield, 2014) and artificial consciousness (Holland,
2007) and imitation (Demiris & Johnson, 2006).
So far, cognitive science has not elucidated the computa-
tional processes underlying cognitive simulation in
humans. As such, researchers in robotics wanting to emu-
late this functionality have to resort to ad hoc architectures
based on an analysis of the problem. Marques and Holland
(2009) presented an extensive analysis and overview of the
computational requirements for implementing functional
imagination in robots. While our Simulation Module was
constructed in an ad hoc fashion, it satisfies the require-
ments for functional imagination as outlined by these
authors. First, the Simulation Module allows the A-robot
to predict and represent counterfactual realities and sen-
sory states. Also, the simulation results are evaluated using
the simulated outcome states. The A-robot is also capable
of simulating multiple alternative actions. Therefore, we
conclude that our Simulation Module constitutes a func-
tional (albeit minimal) form of robotic functional
imagination.
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